Quote from: Blauritter on October 08, 2013, 03:02:31 PM
it's not your imagination ,it's your lack of knowledge about the war in the east.
You need to separate fact from contrived myth.   the wehrmacht could've been better prepared for the vastness of the russian steppes but in war you can't always predict the future.

They were far better mechanized than the soviets and  far better trained .

Germans  lacked  the manpower to continue as well as the petrol and other resources. Lend lease was also extended to soviets lest you forget, But nice try..

I'm not making excuses for anyone. Hitler played his cards in logical sequence but as any poker player will tell you you can play each card logically and you can still lose the hand. Hitler was a gambler.

The Germans made the worst of all possible military decisions. They assumed they were so much better, that their enemies would simply collapse before them. It didn't happen because UNLIKE WESTERN EUROPE AND POLAND the Red Army had hundreds of miles of territory to retreat into. Didn't they read anything about Napoleons campaign? The only reason the Wehrmacht had any success at all was the pre invasion disposition of the Red Army. They had moved forward to occupy territory they had just acquired, and had not even prepared many of their defensive positions. They were still in flux between their pre-war borders and their new borders in Poland, The Baltic States, Finland and Moldavia. The Soviets indeed weren't as well trained as the Wehrmacht, but they could replace their losses, the Wehrmacht couldn't. As for Lend Lease, the thing that the US gave to the Soviets that gave them the advantage, was the 21/2 ton truck. By 1943, Soviets were riding to battle, with their supplies following them in other trucks. The Wehrmacht was walking, hoping the horses pulling their supplies didn't die of the cold. Speaking of the cold, the Red Army wore clothing suitable for their environment; the Wehrmacht just froze. Jackboots and those helmets are great for goose stepping in parades, they suck in the cold of Russia. And the invasion might have worked better if the Wehrmacht hadn't made it plan to the Russian people that they were fighting for their lives.

Quote from: mdgiles on October 09, 2013, 09:22:36 AM
The Germans made the worst of all possible military decisions. They assumed they were so much better, that their enemies would simply collapse before them. It didn't happen because UNLIKE WESTERN EUROPE AND POLAND the Red Army had hundreds of miles of territory to retreat into. Didn't they read anything about Napoleons campaign? The only reason the Wehrmacht had any success at all was the pre invasion disposition of the Red Army. They had moved forward to occupy territory they had just acquired, and had not even prepared many of their defensive positions. They were still in flux between their pre-war borders and their new borders in Poland, The Baltic States, Finland and Moldavia. The Soviets indeed weren't as well trained as the Wehrmacht, but they could replace their losses, the Wehrmacht couldn't. As for Lend Lease, the thing that the US gave to the Soviets that gave them the advantage, was the 21/2 ton truck. By 1943, Soviets were riding to battle, with their supplies following them in other trucks. The Wehrmacht was walking, hoping the horses pulling their supplies didn't die of the cold. Speaking of the cold, the Red Army wore clothing suitable for their environment; the Wehrmacht just froze. Jackboots and those helmets are great for goose stepping in parades, they suck in the cold of Russia. And the invasion might have worked better if the Wehrmacht hadn't made it plan to the Russian people that they were fighting for their lives.

Well said, Giles, but I think a holistic view works better for this question. Simply stated, Hitler's Germany NEVER prepared itself for a long-range strategic war.

This fact is so apparent in so many things! As you pointed out, Germany was never fully mechanized, even in terms of transport. Walking or riding a horse across the Russian steppes might have been the fashion in Napoleon's day, but not, as you point, when your enemy was riding to the front lines in American deuce-and-a-half's. The Luftwaffe, rightly appreciated and devastatingly applied as an integral part of blitzkrieg, was a tactical force, meant for short-range, short-term campaigns. Almost every plane Germany turned out before and during the war was a close-support vehicle; one of Hitler's standing orders to the Luftwaffe was that EVERY new fighter or bomber had to be capable of dive-bombing. Bf109s escorting little twin-engine He111's to London from French airfields had less than 20 minutes over the target because of their tiny fuel tanks.

Germany's efforts at strategic destruction came with the V weapons, but far too little and far too late to make a difference. Their efforts at developing atomic weapons died in the womb. They beat everybody to the jet age, fielding the first operational jet fighter -- but the Me262 had been redesigned (and hampered) to be dive-bombing capable.

Perhaps Germany's best stab at strategic thinking was naval. Forget Bismarck and Tirpitz -- misbegotten wastes of money and time. But the U-boats! But even with them, the military failed to provide adequate support and protection, to the point where they were essentially useless and stuck in their pens, more vulnerable at sea than the prey they hunted.

Quote from: TboneAgain on October 09, 2013, 10:42:59 AM
Well said, Giles, but I think a holistic view works better for this question. Simply stated, Hitler's Germany NEVER prepared itself for a long-range strategic war.

This fact is so apparent in so many things! As you pointed out, Germany was never fully mechanized, even in terms of transport. Walking or riding a horse across the Russian steppes might have been the fashion in Napoleon's day, but not, as you point, when your enemy was riding to the front lines in American deuce-and-a-half's. The Luftwaffe, rightly appreciated and devastatingly applied as an integral part of blitzkrieg, was a tactical force, meant for short-range, short-term campaigns. Almost every plane Germany turned out before and during the war was a close-support vehicle; one of Hitler's standing orders to the Luftwaffe was that EVERY new fighter or bomber had to be capable of dive-bombing. Bf109s escorting little twin-engine He111's to London from French airfields had less than 20 minutes over the target because of their tiny fuel tanks.

Germany's efforts at strategic destruction came with the V weapons, but far too little and far too late to make a difference. Their efforts at developing atomic weapons died in the womb. They beat everybody to the jet age, fielding the first operational jet fighter -- but the Me262 had been redesigned (and hampered) to be dive-bombing capable.

Perhaps Germany's best stab at strategic thinking was naval. Forget Bismarck and Tirpitz -- misbegotten wastes of money and time. But the U-boats! But even with them, the military failed to provide adequate support and protection, to the point where they were essentially useless and stuck in their pens, more vulnerable at sea than the prey they hunted.

One of their worse decisions was not to go to a war economy, immediately upon entering the war. Instead Hitler decided to feed the fiction that all the wars campaign were going to be as short as those in Western Europe. In any case, I think part of the reason for Germany not mechanizing was their shortage of oil. Of course if he had put off the invasion of Russia, and finished off the English in the Middle East, the oil problem would taken care of itself. I can see why the allies came to see Hitler as their "best general".

Quote from: mdgiles on October 09, 2013, 01:32:55 PM
One of their worse decisions was not to go to a war economy, immediately upon entering the war. Instead Hitler decided to feed the fiction that all the wars campaign were going to be as short as those in Western Europe. In any case, I think part of the reason for Germany not mechanizing was their shortage of oil. Of course if he had put off the invasion of Russia, and finished off the English in the Middle East, the oil problem would taken care of itself. I can see why the allies came to see Hitler as their "best general".

I think Germany's oil shortage is overplayed. That being said, I don't see how not going to "a war economy" would have made much difference. If there were no oil to be had, a mountain of German money wouldn't have changed a thing.

In the end, what Hitler ran out of was not so much oil -- though the stuff was in short supply. He ran short of skilled personnel, especially pilots. Oil and the like can be taken by force, to immediate gain. Pilots and tank drivers and competent officers take years to develop, and there is no substitute for that time.

Quote from: TboneAgain on October 09, 2013, 04:54:56 PM
I think Germany's oil shortage is overplayed. That being said, I don't see how not going to "a war economy" would have made much difference. If there were no oil to be had, a mountain of German money wouldn't have changed a thing.

In the end, what Hitler ran out of was not so much oil -- though the stuff was in short supply. He ran short of skilled personnel, especially pilots. Oil and the like can be taken by force, to immediate gain. Pilots and tank drivers and competent officers take years to develop, and there is no substitute for that time.

Germany started the war with more experienced soldiers than any other country -- because of their involvement in the Spanish Civil War.  And they had the most advanced equipment - simply because they built up from scratch and knew when the war would start.  By the end, Luftwaffe pilots were joking that the only way out was with either an Iron Cross -- or a wooden cross.  And the U-Boat seamen suffered a mortality rate second only to that of the Kamikazes.

Meanwhile, America was cycling Aces out to train new pilots.  And by the end of the war, when Japan couldn't make one new carrier, America was producing a top-of-the-line carrier every month - along with all the planes, trained sailors, support ships, and everything else the military could possibly need.

Tactical mistakes were made by everyone, and trying to second-guess incredibly difficult decisions seventy years later is really pointless.  But strategically speaking, the war was over the day America entered it.  That's the elephant in the living room.

Quote from: TboneAgain on October 09, 2013, 04:54:56 PM
I think Germany's oil shortage is overplayed. That being said, I don't see how not going to "a war economy" would have made much difference. If there were no oil to be had, a mountain of German money wouldn't have changed a thing.

In the end, what Hitler ran out of was not so much oil -- though the stuff was in short supply. He ran short of skilled personnel, especially pilots. Oil and the like can be taken by force, to immediate gain. Pilots and tank drivers and competent officers take years to develop, and there is no substitute for that time.

Funny you should mention pilot training. Both the Nazis and the Japanese used the same system. You flew until you were shot out of the air. The Americans and British had you fly a certain number of missions, then you were rotated back to teach a new batch of pilots. That's why you see Japanese and Germans aces with those ridiculous numbers of victories. They had to shoot down a hundred enemy fighters to simply still be alive. In any case, the Americans and British had a large number of fairly well trained pilots. Whereas with the Nazis and Japanese, you were either fighting a super ace or - far more common - you were fighting complete novices.

Quote from: mdgiles on October 10, 2013, 04:29:58 PM
Funny you should mention pilot training. Both the Nazis and the Japanese used the same system. You flew until you were shot out of the air. The Americans and British had you fly a certain number of missions, then you were rotated back to teach a new batch of pilots. That's why you see Japanese and Germans aces with those ridiculous numbers of victories. They had to shoot down a hundred enemy fighters to simply still be alive. In any case, the Americans and British had a large number of fairly well trained pilots. Whereas with the Nazis and Japanese, you were either fighting a super ace or - far more common - you were fighting complete novices.

Good points, Giles. I would point out that one reason you see German aces "with those ridiculous numbers" was the fact that they mainly flew on the Eastern Front, where they went up against poorly trained Soviet airmen in generally inferior aircraft. One that comes to mind is Erich Hartmann, credited with 352 kills, most of which were racked up in a ridiculously short time on the Eastern Front. As that front moved in reverse back toward Germany, he engaged more and more Western pilots. But in his early career, he had it pretty easy poking Soviet novices in crappy planes out of the sky.

And, as you point out, German -- and Japanese -- airmen served from beginning to end. There was no "cycle" for them. Hartmann, as just one example, flew for nearly four year. His last confirmed kill took place on May 8, 1945, when the war in Europe was essentially over. He had been flying fighters since 1942.

I would agree that is the worst mistake on the Europe side of the war.  Overall, I would say the biggest mistake of World War 2 was bombing Pearl Harbor.  I don't think anything compares to that.

Quote from: mdgiles on October 09, 2013, 01:32:55 PM
One of their worse decisions was not to go to a war economy, immediately upon entering the war. Instead Hitler decided to feed the fiction that all the wars campaign were going to be as short as those in Western Europe. In any case, I think part of the reason for Germany not mechanizing was their shortage of oil. Of course if he had put off the invasion of Russia, and finished off the English in the Middle East, the oil problem would taken care of itself. I can see why the allies came to see Hitler as their "best general".

Indeed Hitler was gambling that the Soviets would be crushed even easier than during world war 1 since the french and british was already crushed and to capture the caucasus oil fields with Operation Edelweiss.

Quote from: TboneAgain on October 09, 2013, 04:54:56 PM
I think Germany's oil shortage is overplayed. That being said, I don't see how not going to "a war economy" would have made much difference. If there were no oil to be had, a mountain of German money wouldn't have changed a thing.

The Germans had developed good process for creating synthetic fuel from coal (something South Africa would pretty much perfect when the west embargoed SA in order to get the communist into power). But that wasn't enough, Rommel did not have the fuel necessary to fight back the Americans effectively, it probably would not have a difference in the end but they did have oil supply shortages that made it impossible to defend efficiently.

Sorry if I'm repeating someone else here, but let's not forget how stupid Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor was. 

The American people were very ambivalent, if not downright hostile, to fighting another World War, especially one which looked far away from the US.  Until Pear Harbor. Then it became personal.  In fact, even throughout the war, the American people had blood red hatred for the Japanese and far less hatred for Germany, and many resented FDR's "Germany first" strategy. 

It was America's industrial might (and millions of Russian lives thrown at the Wermacht by Stalin) that won the war.  After Pearl Harbor Hitler was compelled to immediately declare war on the US, but there's plenty of reason to believe he didn't really want to, knowing that American industrial capacity would wreck him.  Had the Japanese never attacked Americans or their holdings in the Pacific, or did so much later, it may have given Hitler a chance in Europe. 

Quote from: Egg on December 13, 2013, 01:20:41 PM
Sorry if I'm repeating someone else here, but let's not forget how stupid Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor was. 

The American people were very ambivalent, if not downright hostile, to fighting another World War, especially one which looked far away from the US.  Until Pear Harbor. Then it became personal.  In fact, even throughout the war, the American people had blood red hatred for the Japanese and far less hatred for Germany, and many resented FDR's "Germany first" strategy. 

It was America's industrial might (and millions of Russian lives thrown at the Wermacht by Stalin) that won the war.  After Pearl Harbor Hitler was compelled to immediately declare war on the US, but there's plenty of reason to believe he didn't really want to, knowing that American industrial capacity would wreck him.  Had the Japanese never attacked Americans or their holdings in the Pacific, or did so much later, it may have given Hitler a chance in Europe.

The most amazingly stupid thing about the Japanese attack is that it was unnecessary. They could have bypassed the Philippines. America simply was not going to war to protect European colonial possessions.

You are completely correct about that.  And being an island, you'd think they would have put more energy into naval resources.  Their naval power was used in a primarily defense, rather that offensive, manner by '43. 

Quote from: Egg on December 16, 2013, 08:49:54 AM
You are completely correct about that.  And being an island, you'd think they would have put more energy into naval resources.  Their naval power was used in a primarily defense, rather that offensive, manner by '43.

In terms of proportion, it's probably accurate to say that Imperial Japan invested a larger fraction of its military budget into naval resources than any other combatant in WWII. But to compare the size of Japan's "resource pie" with that of, say, the U.S. is just silly. I think the Japanese rolled the dice in a very big way with the attack on Pearl Harbor, seeking not to keep the U.S. out of the war in the Pacific, but to delay meaningful U.S. action long enough for the IJN and the Army to establish a defensible perimeter that protected the resources the Japanese so desperately needed, especially oil and coal and rubber. Yamamoto is said to have estimated that he could run wild in the Pacific for six months if the Pearl Harbor operation succeeded. He was pretty close. Almost six months to the day after Pearl Harbor, an American task force fought a Japanese invasion force to a standstill at Coral Sea.

But a month after that, the Japanese came to Midway Island with an attack force that included four of the carriers that had participated in the Pearl Harbor attack. Two of those were Kaga and Akagi, the biggest and best aircraft carriers in the IJN at the time. All four Japanese carriers were lost. The IJN never recovered from Midway. Replacement fleet carriers with similar aircraft capacity didn't come into service until late 1944 -- and they were promptly sunk, for the most part, by a U.S. Navy that by that time had mastered the Pacific Ocean.

In short, the Japanese naval forces were primarily on the defensive by 1943 because they had lost their primary offensive weapons at Midway and could not replace them.

Quote from: Egg on December 13, 2013, 01:20:41 PM
Sorry if I'm repeating someone else here

When you say you're "sorry" WHILE your doing something, all that does is take away any excuse you could possibly have.

Quote from: TboneAgain on December 16, 2013, 02:17:28 PM
In terms of proportion, it's probably accurate to say that Imperial Japan invested a larger fraction of its military budget into naval resources than any other combatant in WWII. But to compare the size of Japan's "resource pie" with that of, say, the U.S. is just silly. I think the Japanese rolled the dice in a very big way with the attack on Pearl Harbor, seeking not to keep the U.S. out of the war in the Pacific, but to delay meaningful U.S. action long enough for the IJN and the Army to establish a defensible perimeter that protected the resources the Japanese so desperately needed, especially oil and coal and rubber. Yamamoto is said to have estimated that he could run wild in the Pacific for six months if the Pearl Harbor operation succeeded. He was pretty close. Almost six months to the day after Pearl Harbor, an American task force fought a Japanese invasion force to a standstill at Coral Sea.

But a month after that, the Japanese came to Midway Island with an attack force that included four of the carriers that had participated in the Pearl Harbor attack. Two of those were Kaga and Akagi, the biggest and best aircraft carriers in the IJN at the time. All four Japanese carriers were lost. The IJN never recovered from Midway. Replacement fleet carriers with similar aircraft capacity didn't come into service until late 1944 -- and they were promptly sunk, for the most part, by a U.S. Navy that by that time had mastered the Pacific Ocean.

In short, the Japanese naval forces were primarily on the defensive by 1943 because they had lost their primary offensive weapons at Midway and could not replace them.

What fascinates me is the total Japanese fixation on offensive warfare, to the exclusion of defensive operations that ANY island nation MUST have - like anti submarine warfare. This ties into another pet peeve I have about German submarine warfare. The UK was desperate for convoy escorts, to the point of buying old destroyers from the US. So why wasn't it a priority of German U-boats to sink the escort craft. It takes much longer to build and train the crew of an escort craft, than it does to build and train the crew of a freighter. I always see the attack on a convoy in two phrases. The first U-boat group was to attack and sink as many of the escorts as possible. The second phrase was for the rest of the wolfpack to attack the now defenseless convoy.