Started by winterset, March 16, 2021, 12:59:22 AM
Quote from: Hoofer on April 08, 2021, 06:05:12 AMSeems to be a weird thing about the Brits, they expect everyone else to "rise to their level of warfare".Tea breaks, for instance, but this is one of the quotes I was looking for:https://nationalinterest.org/article/cultures-of-spying-772"n the United States, spying has often been regarded as necessary, at times even as vital. But it has never been regarded as a normal peacetime pursuit. During the Second World War, the CIA's precursor, the OSS, mounted a vast cryptographic effort against Germany and Japan, thanks in part to the support of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. Yet Stimson was also the man who, as Secretary of State in 1929, closed up the State Department's cryptographic section with the famous quip that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail." With its post-Victorian overtones, that quip now has the resonance of a bygone age. Not so, however, the assumption that lies behind it: Spying has no place in a "normal" world."More food for thoughthttps://www.historynet.com/ultra-the-misunderstood-allied-secret-weapon.htm
Quote from: winterset on April 09, 2021, 04:07:51 AMArticle is very interesting but there are some statements made that are misleading.Ultra messages were in several different levels of importance. The ones mentioned about prior to the Battle of the Bulge the germans moving supplies into that area was contradicted by other ultra messages that showed no movement of units supposedly using those supplies. And more important there were no messages regarding any attack that came from ANY major german unit. Thus the assumption made was that no attack was coming. Ignoring NON Ultra intelligence was a major problem later in the war in favor of anything- or in that case nothing- from ultra. This article talks up Bletchley Park like they were gods and frankly THAT was wrong; they made some serious mistakes themselves. Now the fact that the Germans were sloppy with Signint security was very true. Their master race orientation at the top level did not help.The major problem on the Allied side as regards intelligence was too many senior British intelligence officers were too much of the mindset that if THEY did not develop the intelligence it was not worth that much. This was made blindingly obvious prior to Market Garden as the Dutch were very consistent about increased German strength around Arnhem.