Started by tbone0106, June 24, 2012, 11:31:48 AM
Quote from: Solar on June 24, 2012, 11:52:30 AMI'm confused, are you saying battle ships are outmoded?
Quote from: tbone0106 on June 24, 2012, 12:15:42 PMMore than that, I'm saying that the Japanese knew that battleships were never again going to be the juggernauts of years before. For their sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, they brought along two fairly small battleships -- neither of which fired a shot -- and SIX aircraft carriers. They knew which guns they wanted to fire.Proof of the concept came just six months later, when four of those six carriers were blown out of the water in the sea around Midway Island, an event that literally changed the tide of the war in the Pacific. Consider this: Prior to Pearl Harbor, naval force doctrine was based on the battleship. Then the Japs showed up and proved it all wrong. I still wonder why they targeted the battleships, and attacked knowing that the carriers were out at sea. (Yeah, they knew with certainty; they had GOBS of spies in Hawaii.)In my mind, it's a paradox. Why did the Japanese expend such a powerful blow to kill ships that they were in the process of proving useless? The literature tells you that not all Japanese naval leaders thought in December 1941 that battleships were useless. BUT the Pearl Harbor attack is nothing if it's not proof of that concept.Talk to me....
Quote from: mdgiles on June 24, 2012, 12:37:50 PMThey targeted the battle ships because their entire naval philosophy was based on Mahan - and their expeirences in the Russo -Japanese War. It;s why they built two enormous 78,000 ton battleships, when the steel could have been better used in more aircraft carriers. So wedded were the Japanese to the idea of a war deciding major fleet engagement, that they gave no thought to anything else. For example, with the lesson of Britain and wW! behind them, how could an ISLAND NATION let themselves get caught so flat footed in anti submarine warfare. And knowing the US had to come at them across the Pacific, why no submarine fleet of their own to sit off the West Coast and the Panama Canal?
Quote from: Solar on June 24, 2012, 12:47:37 PMI think you're referring to Yamato and Musashi, two beautiful works of engineering.The fact that they were planning an entire class of ships based on their design, says Japan thought Naval power was a necessity, not outmoded.
Quote from: mdgiles on June 24, 2012, 01:03:26 PMAn Island Nation depends on naval power, The Japanese simply had the wrong kind of naval power.
Quote from: Solar on June 24, 2012, 01:10:40 PMThey also underestimated our ability to recover in such a huge way.
Quote from: mdgiles on June 24, 2012, 01:17:15 PMYamamoto didn't . He had been a Naval Attache and had attended Harvard. He had seen Pittsburgh and Detroit with his own eyes. He knew Japan couldn't win.
Quote from: tbone0106 on June 24, 2012, 02:46:59 PMYamamoto gave his own navy six months to have its way. He was correct almost to the day.I think there's a fundamental difference between what you're calling "naval power," Solar, and the classic broadside-firing, damn-the-torpedoes ships of the line. Modern aircraft carriers are more creatures of airpower and raw technology, I think, and less relics of traditional navies. It is padoxical that the the Japanese traveled all that way and sank or damaged all eight battleships of the Pacific Fleet without firing a single battleship artillery shell -- all the proof either side should ever need that the day of the battleship was gone.
Quote from: mdgiles on June 24, 2012, 11:19:56 PMOne other thing, why didn't the Japanese take advantage of their ally's - Nazi Germany's - technology? Why were they waiting until the war was almost over to ask the Germans for jet engines and superior tanks. The Japanese aren't incompetent, and there are rumors the the Japanese built and exploded an A-bomb. They had facilities in Korea and Manchuria that were beyond the range of American air, especially earlier in the war,; they could have turned out superior aircraft and tanks in droves.